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The crow-th of modern econornles nas been charactenzed by the emergence, development and decline of 
different indusmes. Moreover. industrial evoiution is characterized by intense change, at any time scaie 
which micht - be considered. Sew rims enter the industry. some exit; some firms grow, other decline. In 
addition. econornlc entities expand or conuact their boundaries and undergo organizational change 
These remarks have been advanced by several economists in the past. Both Alfred Marshall and Joseph 
Schumpeter, although in different ways, focused their attention on the internal dynamism that occurs 
within any one industry. Moreover. in the Principles of Economics ( 1890) and the Economics of Indusny 
( 1879) Marshall noticed that an economy is characterized by quite different sectors, some of which are 
fast growing while others are deciining and that their specific relevance for the overall economy may 
change over time. This point was greatly emphasized also by Schumpeter in "Business Cycles" which 
contains a lenghty and articulated discussion of the emergence and decline of leading industries in the 
development of the indusmal economies of the past centuries. Simon Kumets noticed also in "Secular 
,Movements in Prices and Production" (1930) that economic growth is characterized by shifts in the 
relative importance of leading indusmes wnich show life cycles in terms of sales and innovations. Colin 
Clark reaffirmed this point at a more aggregated level in "Conditions of Economic ProgressM(1940) by 
linking the stages of economic g~owth to the rise and decline of major sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. ivnile Hollis Chenery in his "Patterns of developmenr 1950-70" analyzed the 
structural charactenstics of the economy by grouping indusmes in early, middle and late ones. Finally 
W. W.Rostow in "The Process of Economic Growth" (1  952) and "Stages of Economic Growth" (1 960) 
pointed to the fact that there are r egh i t i e s  in the dvnamics of industries, which usually starts with a 
take off and then moves to technoiogcal maturity, usually associated with high mass consumption. 
Most of these authors had in mind 3 broad d-mamic quaiitative analysis of the emergence. development 
and decline of indusmes. joinriy with the consideration of the turmoil generated by competition in the 
shorter run. They never entered inro the details of how indusmes change over time in terms of their 
structural features and forms of organization. but they certainly set up the stage for possible subsequent 
studies of the factors arfecting rhe structural evolution of indusmes: think, for instance, to Schumpeter's 
"Capitalism, Socialism and Dsmocracy" ( 1942). 
These studies did not take off and the insights of Marshall, Schumpeter and Kutznets about industrial 
dynamics were not developed. During the 1950s. 1960s and 1970s indusmal economists concentrated 
their effons on the static anaiysis of the structure of industries: in those years industrial economics 
became concerned with rhe expianation of the determinants of features of industrial structure and 
penomance. such as concenmrion. rims size and profitability. The pioneering conmbutions of leading 
indusmal economists such as hiason and Bain ,and the so called "Harvard Tradition" in industrial 
organization during the 1960s and 1970s emphasized the importance of some relatively invariant 
features of production technoiogies as ultimate determinants of observed structures and performances 
under the implicit assumption that rnicroeconornic behaviours would be shaped - at least in a first 
ideas prcscntcd in this paper owc 3 zrcu dcal 10 the conversarlons and discussions we have been having at Merent times 
=a in duiercnt places malnlv w~th  ti:a Dos~. David Lane. Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter. Indeed, in various cases, 
they nave acruailv suggested them. \Vhilst we fully acknowledge their fimdamental conmbutions, we suongly emphasize that 
rhe usual disclaimers and caveats havc to be taken very senouslv in the present case. 
approximation - by these deeper technoiogical constraints. A most notable exception in this respect has 
been Stigler's analysis of the determinants of vertical integration during the growth of an industry. 
During the 1980s the interpretative focus of the "New Industrial Organization" shifted to the motives and 
the rational decision procedures of individual agents. Symmetrically, structural constraints on 
microbehaviours have been treated in rather casual manners. 
Despite these profound differences. however, these two opposite archetypes, the structuralist approach of 
the 1960s and 1970s and the contemporary game theoretic models of industrial economics, have both a 
static and equilibrium flavour. In the former, the burden of the interpretation of empirical regularities is 
pushed upon unexplained features of sectoral production functions. In the latter, the core of the exercise 
is an ex-post generalization showing that whatever is observed can also be interpreted as the equilibrium 
outcome of some (rather sophisticated) strategic interactions. 
Most of the hints and suggestions of Marshall, Schumpeter and Kutnetz implicitly pointing to a better 
understanding of the dynamics and evolution of industries have been left undeveloped in current 
theoretical models. Recently however, empirical research has uncovered a large number of stylized facts 
about industrial dynamics and evolution which fit uneasily with the structuralist or the game theoretic 
explanations. In recent years the development of detailed histories of specific industries in terms of 
technological innovation and structural change and the growing availability of large longitudinal micro 
data-bases have significantly improved economists' data and knowledge, at the same generating new 
questions and puzzles. 
Some of these questions about industry dynamics have also started to be addressed by theoretical 
models. Still, these models address oniy specific aspects of industry evolution. More substantially, we 
still do not know much about the dynamics and evolution of industries as a whole. The debate on "long 
waves" is possibly the only recent example of studies concerning the long-run properties of the evolution 
of industries. But still. our knowiedge is extremely limited, particularly as it concerns the patterns of 
change of economic organizations and structures, not only as in terms of entry and exit of firms and 
firms' growth but also in terms of \.ertical integration, diversification, creation and closures of 
relationships and networks among firms and changing role of institutions. 
In this paper we aim to shed light on what we know about this issue. We will discuss the scattered 
empirical evidence. the major stylized facts, the current explanations and the relevant unanswered 
questions concerning the dynamics and evolution of industrial structure. We will also point to possible 
directions of future research. 
We shall distinguish between three leveis of analysis which can be found in the theoretical and empirical 
literature: 
a. specific structural dimensions of industrial ddvnamics; 
b. structural dynamics according to the life cycle model; 
c. industrial structural evolution. 
The first level refers to specific features of industrial structures such as industrial demography, firms' 
growth and size distributions, persistence in asymmetric performances at the firm level. The second 
refers to the dynamics over time of several structural variables examined jointly: entry, exit, fkm size and 
concentration as well as product and process innovation. The third refers to a broader view of industrial 
structure and its evolution over time. In addition to the dimensions examined in the life cycle model of 
industry dynamics (entry, firm size and industrial concentration), industrial structural evolution includes 
and focusses on the emergence and transformation of technologies and products within an industry, on 
the changing boundaries of established firms, on firms' growth, vertical integration and diversification, 
on the relationships among firms. and on the role of institutions others than firms within an industry ( 
government, scientific and financial institutions, suppliers and users). 
In the paper we will argue that whilst a large part of the scattered empirical evidence on the evolution of 
industries refers to structural evolution, we have almost no empirical generalizations, taxonomies or 
theories on how industries evolve over time. In the last section we will therefore discuss some 
conceptual and methodological problems that arise from the attempt to analyze structural evolution. We 
advance the view that the explanation of this phenomenon requires major empirical advances in our 
knowledge of industry dynamics and evolution. 
2. Specific structural dimensions of industry dynamics2 
Empirical research has uncovered over the years a large number of stylized facts. 
a) persistent significant diversity within and across industrial sectors in firm behaviour, organization and 
performance; 
b) significant degrees of turbulence in industrial dynamics; 
b) sectoral specificities in industrial dynamics; 
c) regularities in some aggregate statistics describing industrial structures. despite such variability at the 
microlevel. 
Let us briefly illustrate some of the major and best known examples of this kind of evidence. 
2.1 Persistence of tiiversity ur~~ony/irms 
One may start from the naive obsenration of high degrees of heterogeneity in firms capabilities, 
organization. strategies and performance. These differences concern significant differentials in costs and 
productivity (Nelson and Winter 1982. Baily 1987, Contini and Revelli 1990); profitability (Mueller 
1990, Geroski and Jacquemin 1988); output and innovative activities (Freeman 1982, Jaffe 1986, 
Griliches 1986, Pate1 and Pavitt 199 1, Malerba, Orsenigo and Peretto,1994). 
What is particularly puzzling, however. is not the existence of such diversity, but its persistence over 
time. For example, as far as innovation is concerned, firms which have innovated at time t have - ceteris 
paribus - a higher probability of innovating at time t+l (what is known in the literature as 
Z ~ h i s  section draws heavily frorn Dosi. Marslli. Orsenigo and Sah~atore (1993) and frorn Dosi, Malerba and Orsenigo (1993). 
cumulativeness). The same applies to profits: firms enjoying higher (lower) profits are expected to earn 
higher (lower) profits also in the future. That is to say, profits don not seem to converge to a common rate 
of return. 
Persistence in innovative and profitability differentials may reflect either (or both) the persistence of 
differential technological capabilities and productive efficiencies which are not eroded away by the 
competitive process or the sluggishness of imitation and competitive processes. The evidence available 
does not provide a definite answer to this question. Persistence seems to characterize firms' innovative 
activities in several technologies (Malerba. Orsenigo and Peretto, 1994). As far as profits are concerned, 
it tends to suggest that the adjustment of profits to their firm-specific "permanent" values is rather quick, 
although a significant variability is observed across different countries. 
2.2 Turbulence 
Several studies have now shown that all industries are characterized by high degrees of turbulence, due 
to entry, exit and changes in market shares (Beesley and Hamilton 1984, Acs and Audretsch, 1989, 1990, 
199 1). 
In particular, gross entry is a pervasive phenomena. Birth rates are quite high, even in industries 
characterized by high barriers to entry (for example, high capital intensity). Most entrants are new small 
firms, far below any measure of efficient minimum scale. However other entrants are firms operating in 
other industries or countries which engaged into a process of diversification. In this case, entry often 
occurs through the acquisition of existing plants. The role of this second type of entry is limited in terms 
of number of firms. but much more important in terms of share of output or employment. 
Mortality however is high too, so that turbulence (entry and mortality) is significant but the rates of net 
entry are much smaller than gross entry. In general, a large percentage of the entrants exits the industry 
within few years after entry and the probability of survival appears to increase with age. Finally, it must 
be noted that surviving firms have either a higher initial size or higher growth rates. Bigger initial size 
implies lower growth, but higher survival. (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1988, Baldwin and Gorecki 
199 1, Cable and Scwalbach 1991. Acs and Audretsch 1991 and 1992, Phillips and Kirchoff 1989, 
Audretsch and Mahmood 1992, Geroski and Schwalbach 199 1). 
An interpretation of this evidence is that turbulence is primarily a characteristic of the fringe of each 
industry. This seems corroborated by the observation that substitution of "old" firms with "new" firms 
occurs to a much larger extent among small, young firms which are relatively similar to each other. In 
other words, entrants in the hnge are usually not more efficient than the incumbents. Turbulence appears 
to be much lower in the core of the industry and among large firms: large firms appear to be relatively 
sheltered from selective pressures (Levinthal 199 1). This is confirmed for the innovative activities of the 
core and the hnge of firms within industries (Malerba-Orsenigo,l994). 
2.3 I+ms growth und stuble skewed disfributions ofjirm size 
The observation of the stability of a skewed distributions of both firm and plant sizes in manufacturing - 
approximately a Pareto distribution - over all the history for which data can be estimated is certainly one 
of the best known "stylized facts" in industrial economics. This phenomenon has been usually accounted 
for by some version of Gibrat's Law of proportionate growth. In its simplest formulation, this "Law" 
states that firms growth rates are i.i.d. random variables independent from sue. The Law generates log- 
normal (or under suitable modifications. Yule or Pareto distributions) of firm s u e  (Ijiri and Simon 1977, 
Simon and Bonini 1 958). 
However. the evidence about the Gibrat process is mixed. It mostly tends to reject it or to restrict its 
applicability to particular size classes. In particular, recent studies show that both firms' growth rates and 
their variance tend to fall with size and age (Hall 1987, Evans 1987a and 1987b), whilst Acs and 
Audretsch (1991) find some corroboration for the Gibrat's Law by including in the sample also firms 
exiting the industry. In any case. Gibrat's Law seems to be better suited to describe the growth process of 
relatively big firms (Geroski and Machin 1992). 
2.4 Sec~orul ti~gerences in  he specflc slruclural di~nensions of in dust^ dynamics 
Whilst the above mentioned phenomena constitute rather general characteristics of industrial structures, 
at a finer level of disaggregation one finds significant differences across sectors; Indeed it is worth 
stressing that intersectoral differences are bigger the more disaggregate the observations on industrial 
structures are. At the static level. sectoral differences in some dimensions of industrial structure are the 
very essence of industrial economics. And nobody would seem to be unduly surprised by the 
consideration that industries differ a lot also in terms of advertising intensity, capital intensity and so on. 
Sectoral specifities. however concern also the persistence of diversity across firms, turbulence and firms' 
growth. 
Persistence of profits appears to depend on industry- specific characteristics as well as on firm-specific 
characteristics. In particular, industry-specific features as the intensity of advertising and R-D appear to 
be robust explanatory variables of the persistence of profits above the norm. Empirical evidence is rather 
fuzzy as it concerns the effects of industry- and firm-specific variables of the speed of adjustment. 
Important differences among countries and industries emerge in both the extent to which profit 
differentials permanently persist and in the speed of adjustment to "equilibrium". In general, however, 
firm-specific variables are more important in explaining the long-run "equilibrium" levels of company 
profits, whilst industry-specific variables are more important in the explanation of the adjustment process 
to those long-run equilibrium values. In the U.S.A., excess returns appear to erode more slowly in highly 
concentrated industries, experiencing rapid demand growth, and characterized by significant economies 
of scale. large absolute capital requirements, large sunk outlays and high advertising expenditures 
(Kessides 1990). (Other studies. however challenge these results. cf. Odagiri and Yarnawaki 1990). 
Turbulence differs drastically across sectors. too. The econometric literature investigating the 
determinants of birth rates is now burgeoning. It is now possible to draw some consistent results. 
Turbulence tends to be comparatively lower in industries characterized by high rates of innovation and 
advertising, high capital intensity, low concentration, low growth (Acs and Audretsch 1991). 
However, one has to distinguish between the determinants of gross entry, exit and net entry, and 
between large and small firms. In particular, advertising appears to constitute a greater barrier than capital 
intensity to both gross and net entry, irrespectively of firm sue. Concentration seems to inhibit entry of 
small firms but not of large companies. Similarly, high rates of innovation do not necessarily deter small 
firms from entry. In certain industries. in which small firms account for a significant share of total 
innovative activities, birth rates are rather high. 
Evidence is less clear about the role played by variables like industry growth and profitability. The latter 
variable does not seem to have anv sign~ficant effect in attracting entry, whilst mixed results are obtained 
for industry growth. Similarly, the growth of GNP (but also unemployment) appear to trigger new firms 
formation. In any case, there appears to be no robust evidence about the cyclical behaviour of birth and 
death rates. Some studies report strong correlation between indicators of favourable macroeconomic 
conditions, birth rates (positive) and death rates (negative). Other studies however find absence of 
correlation or even inverse correlation (as in the models of self-employment). 
The probability of survival of new. small firms appear to be lower in capital-intensive industries, and in 
sectors characterized by high rates of innovation and high economies of scale. However, further 
distinctions need to be made. Concentration, scale economies and capital intensity actually seem to 
facilitate survival in the short run. but not in the long run. Indicators of innovativeness do not affect 
survival in the short run, but only in the long run. Moreover, survival is also easier in those industries in 
which small firms are important sources of innovation. 
New surviving firms tend to grow faster in innovative industries. Scale economies and capital intensity 
have a positive effect on growth in the shon run: surviving firms tend to grow faster in the early periods, 
but afterwards those disadvantages do not matter. 
In sum. capital-intensity does not affect entry but survival and thus turbulence. Surviving finns appear to 
grow faster as a function of the gap benveen minimum efficient scale (;MES) of output and firm size. At 
the same time, however, the likelihood of survival decreases as a function of that gap. The same happens 
in terms of innovation rates. Thus. factors promoting growth reduce survival and vice-versa. An 
sxception is the industry growth rate. which has a positive effect on both growth and survival. 
Finally, sectoral specificities appear to affect the processes of firms' growth too. For example, in one of 
the few recent studies which lend some support to Gibrat's law, Acs and Audretsch (1990)- find that 
growth rates are significantly different across tirms-size classes in about 40% of the industries considered 
in their sample. 
2.5 Heg1rlur-i1ies und tuxonori~ies (r!f'technological change and industrv dvnamics 
One of the major results of the empirical studies on industry dynamics has been the discovery of a 
relationship between the djnamics of an industry to the rate of technological change (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Levin. Cohen and Mowery, 1985). 
In this respect, the empirical evidence has also shown that technological change proceeds differently in 
terms of rate, type, direction and effects across technologies, industries and over time. Such diversity 
concerns the sources of innovation. the orzanization of innovative activities and the set of competences 
involved in the innovation process. 
For instance. a first attempt to put some order in such diversity is Pavin's taxonomy (Pavitt 1984) of the 
patterns of organization of innovative activities and features of technological change. Pavitt distinguishes 
between: 
-science based industries, in which R&D and learning by searching are key elements in firms innovative 
activities. The structure of the industry is characterized by large oligopolistic firms with advanced and 
often diversified competences (the core of the industries) and in several cases also by small new (the 
fringe). Major as well as incremental innovations are frequent. Technological trajectories may involve the 
increase in the performance and the physical properties of products, as well as the improvements in 
process yields. 
-scale intensive industries, in which scale economies and productive features play a relevant role in 
competition among firms and in shaping the structure of the industry. Learning by doing and by using, as 
well as R&D, play a major role in the innovative activities of firms. The structure of the industry is 
characterized by large firms, usually upstream vertically integrated, with long term relationships with 
equipment suppliers. High barriers to entry are present. Production and engineering competences play a 
major role in affecting competition among firms. Both process and products innovations are important. 
At the process level. technological trajectories are focussed on the improvements of process yields, 
increases in the scale of production processes and automation. 
-specialized supplier industries, in which firm competences in development, engineering and design, and 
the ability of adapting and tailoring products to user needs, are highly idiosyncratic and mostly tacit. 
They generate products aimed at specific applications, market segments or single users. Interactions with 
users are relevant in the innovative process, and give a relatively high appropriability of product 
innovations. The structure of the indust~y is often made of small and medium size firms, highly 
specialized (or at the most diversified in correlated applications or market segments). Product 
innovations, mostly of the incremental type, are common. Technological trajectories relate to 
improvements in the performance and reliability of products. 
-supplier dominated industries. in which innovative activity is rather limited (mainly of a learning-by- 
using and doing type), centered on incremental improvements and adaptation of new capital equipment, 
which have been developed and produced by upstream suppliers. The rapidity in adopting new 
technologies rather than the generation of new processes and products, becomes a key element in the 
competitive process. This implies that the speed of difhsion rather than technological innovation itself 
becomes crucial in industrial dynamics. Firms in the industry are of small and medium size. 
Technological trajectories are aimed at improvements in process yields. 
At a different level of analysis, another taxonomy concerns the patterns of innovative activity according 
to some typical learning patterns of firms over time. Malerba and Orsenigo (1994a and b) find it 
convenient to classify them on the grounds of the two Schumpeterian models of innovation: Schumpeter 
Mark I (Schumpeter 1912) (characterized by technological ease of entry in an industry, by a major role 
played by new firms in innovative activities and by the continuous erosion of the competitive and 
technological advantages of the established firms in the industry) and Schumpeter Mark II (Schumpeter 
1942) (characterized by relevant barriers to entry for new innovators, by the prevalence of large 
established firms in innovative activities and by the dominance of few firms which are continuously 
innovative through the accumulation over time of technological capabilities). Their empirical analysis of 
the patterns of innovation in Europe, Japan and the United States shows that a significant similarity is 
observed in the sectoral patterns of technological change across countries and that indeed one can 
classifL most technological classes in this way. For instance. empirical investigation suggests that 
systematic differences in the patterns of innovative activities can be found in the three main technological 
families: chemicals, electronics and mechanics. Chemicals and electronics seem to have the 
characteristics of the "Schumpeter 2" model. whilst mechanical industries seem to show a "Schumpeter 
1 " model. 
Empirical research provides some further indications towards a preliminary interpretation of these 
phenomena. In particular. the economics of innovation suggests a few useful concepts in this respect. 
First, innovation studies have started to disentangle the plausible idea that innovative activities are to be 
analyzed as a complex learning process. activities in an industry are heavily affected by the nature of 
what has been termed technological regimes. The notion of technological regime dates back to Nelson 
and Winter ( 1982) and provides a description of the technological environment in which firms operate. 
More generally, Malerba and Orsenigo ( 1990 and 1993) have proposed that a technological regime is a 
particular combination of opportunity and appropriability conditions, degrees of cumulativeness of 
technological knowledge and characteristics of the relevant knowledge base. Opportunity conditions 
reflect the easiness of innovating for any given amount of money invested in search. High opportunities 
represent a powerful incentive to the undertaking of innovative activities. Appropriability condititions 
summarise the possibilities of protecting innovations from imitation and of extracting profits from 
innovative activities. Cumulativeness captures the properties that today innovations and innovative 
activities form the starting point for tomorrow innovations and that today innovative firms are more 
likely to innovate in the future in specific technologies and along specific trajectories than non- 
innovative firms. Technologies differ also in terms of the characteristics of their knowledge base. The 
knowledge base can be primarily tacit, local and firm-specific or rather codified and "universal" and thus 
relatively more easy to get access to. Similarly, the relevant knowledge base may show varying degrees 
of complexity because innovations may require the integration of different scientific disciplines and 
technologies. and because innovative activities may be fed by the contribution of a variety of 
competences concerning the production process, the nature of markets, the features of demand and so 
on. Some of these competences may be external to the firms in the industry and may derive from e.g. 
suppliers of materials. equipment producers, users, universities and government laboratories and so on. 
The notion of technological regime has indeed proved to be useful in providing a framework for 
interpreting a substantial body of empirical evidence on firms organization and strategies (Malerba and 
Orsenigo 1993) and on the sectoral patterns of technical change and industrial structure. The introduction 
even of rough proxies of opportunity and appropriability conditions significantly improves the 
performance of econometric tests on the relationships between market structure (e.g. firm size and 
degrees of concentration) and innovation (Cohen and Levin 1991). Malerba and Orsenigo (1990) show 
in the case of Italy that "Schumpeter Mark I" sectors are characterized by high opportunity and low 
appropriability conditions, which favor the continuous entry of new innovators in the industry, and by 
low cumulativeness conditions. which do not allow the persistence of monopolistic advantages in the 
industry by any one innovator. "Schumpeter Mark 11" patterns are determined by high opportunity, high 
appropriability and high cumulativeness conditions. which allow innovators to incrementally accumulate 
technological knowledge and capabilities and to build up innovative advantages over non-innovators and 
potential entrants. 
The notion of technological rsgime can also be employed to account for the size distribution of firms at 
the industry level as well as for differential patterns of turbulence. Indeed, insofar as innovation is a 
primary force of firm growth and industrial change, there ought to be a direct link between technological 
regimes and the patterns of industrial evolution. For instance, following Gort and Klepper (1982) and 
Winter ( 1  984), Acs and Audretsch ( 199 1 ) argue that sectoral differences in the patterns of entry and exit, 
in the relationships between size. age, growth and survival - and therefore, on firm size distribution - are 
to be accounted for by the nature of the relevant technology, defined in terms of accessibility of 
technological knowledge by tirms external to the industry as opposed to incumbents. Acs and Audretsch 
find indeed econometric evidence that tufbulence is higher and survival rates of young firms are lower in 
industries characterized by an "entrepreneurial" as opposed to a "routinized" technological regime. The 
latter is defined, following Winter ( 1984) as a technological environment characterized by high degrees 
of cumulativeness, appropriability and tacitness of the knowledge base. 
Finally, even more interesting than simply considering the existence of sectoral differences in the 
patterns of industrial dynamics, is the further observations that the patterns of intersectoral differences 
look quite similar across (industrial) countries. For traditional variables of industrial structure such as 
concentration and advenising this remark has been made already by Sutton 1991. As far patterns of 
innovative activities are concerned. Malerba and Orsenigo (1 994a and 1994b) found major similarities in 
the pattern of innovative activities of a speficic technology in the United states, Europe and Japan. 
Each of the empirical regularities discussed above are puzzles for the theory in their own right. The more 
so, if one tries to make sense of all of these facts simultaneously. For instance, the evidence on the 
sectoral specificities in the patterns of innovation and turbulence and on the persistence of differential 
innovative performance and protitability over time clearly contrasts with an explanation of the stability of 
firm size distribution based on some version of Gibrat's Law, whereby independence of the variance of 
growth from initial size is assumed. Similarly this last assumption is clearly at odds with the reported 
evidence on the relationship beween size and age on the one hand, growth and survival on the other. 
In veiy general terms, these puzzles have to do with some major anaytical questions, namely: 
-The "driving forces" of firms' growth? Are they small. multiple and temporary shocks? Or conversely, 
can one identi@ deeper. more persistent factors? 
-Microheterogeneity and invariances in aggregate statistics. For example, how does one reconcile the 
observations on persistent diversity among firms with that of relatively stable Pareto-type size 
distributions? More generally, what kind of processes lead to such aggregate regularities on the basis of 
such messy microdynamics? 
-Cross-sectional variety in industrial structures and dynamic patterns. What does determine these 
observed dificrences? Can one find some underlying variables which shape different dynamic patterns? 
And what is the degree of detail in the description of industries (agents, technology, demand, etc) that is 
necessary for providing a satisfactory account of both similarities and differences across sectors? 
5. The industry life cycle model: technological change and structural dynamics 
3.1 The industry l$e-cycle (ILC) nlodel 
A second level of analysis to which indusmal economists are interested goes beyond the identification 
(and explanation) of aggregate regularities in some specific features of structural dynamics. Rather it 
refers to the ability of reconstructing histories of the evolution of the structure of industries and of 
discovering regularities in the whole dynamic patterns of structural evolution. The empirical evidence on 
such level of analysis is however scarce and fragmentary. A first "typical" stylization of industry 
evolution concerns the never-ending debate upon continuity vs. discontinuity in technological change 
and industry structure. Another version of this discussion (in our view) is the distinction between 
Schumpeter Mark I and I1 model of innovation and industrial change. Also one of the most recent 
debates in industrial economics concerns the existence of any regularity in the forms of evolution of firm 
snuctures, as one can find in the work of Chandler (1992) and Piore and Sabel(1982). 
Up to now however there is only one type of stylizations of the dynamics of industry structure which has 
both a solid empirical backing and has been modelled both in an appreciative and in a formalized way: 
the industry life cycle (Mueller and Tilton, Klein 1977, Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Gort and 
Klepper 1 982; Klepper and Graddy 1988, Utterback and Suarez, 1992, Klepper, 1993). This view 
identifies three stages in the evolution of an industry. First, the beginning of an industry is characterized 
by a radical innovation that sets in motion a stream of product innocations. In some cases the product 
innovation is stimulated by users' needs. in other by advancements in science and technology. In the early 
period, competition is intense and turbulence high. Competition is mainly on functional product 
performance. Innovative stimuli come from users and science. Entry barriers are low and R-D and 
capital requirements limited: several new firms (most of whom are small), enter the industry at an initial 
stage by introducing and producing new products. Early plants are of a small scale and located near 
leading users or the sources of technology. Equipment are general purpose, production is inefficient and 
products are custom. Later in the evolution of an industry, a dominant design emerges (Clark, 1983). 
The emergence of dominant design locks in the development of future products and originates a stream 
of process innovations which make the production process more inflexible and at the same time more 
efficient. Plants become of increasingly large scale. equipment are of special purpose and products 
become standard. Competition shifis from functional product performance to price and product 
differentiation. Industrial concentration increases because baniers to entry increase and selection 
eliminates several existing producers uhicn have not adopted rapidly or forcefully enough the dominant 
design. Finally, industry maturity is characterized by few incremental innovations (mainly of the process 
type), high concentration and possibly collusion among established firms. 
While some of the specific features of this view of the evolution of an industry- entry, exit and the 
number of established firms during industry life cycle- have been empirically tested for a large number of 
indusmes by Gort and Klepper ( 1982) and Klepper and Graddy (1990), only recently a formal model of 
industry life cycle has been proposed by Klepper(1993). The model aims to explain some of the basic 
feature of the industry life cycle as discussed empirically by the above authors and to shed light on the 
role of firms capabilities and size in affecting R&D expenditure, innovation and industry structure. In 
Klepper's model opportunities ofr products and process innovations remain constant. Firms are randomly 
sndowed with distinctive capabilities which do not change over time and which generate product 
innovations. Adjustments costs are convex. Product differentiation persists for one period, after which all 
features are incorporated into a single variant of the product. Firms' process innovations reduce unit 
production costs and their returns are directly proportional to firms output; they are ultimately imitated. 
Firms do nor behave strategically; they are price takers, act independently and choose R&D and 
production levels in order to maximize current profits. As far as entrants are concerned all cohorts of 
potential entrants have the same distibution of innovative expertise. As industry evolves firms enter 
according to the information (increasing over time) about entry opportunities and the number (increasing) 
of incumbents, counteracted however by the depletion of potential entrants which have actually entered 
the industry. 
The basic mechanism of the model is the following. Those early entrants that are able to introduce 
products with distinctive features grow. As a consequence, they have greater incentive to engage in 
process R-D which then lowers average costs and prices. This increasingly drives less innovative firms 
out of the industry. Relatedly, entry decreases over time because entrants, compared to incumbents, have 
an increasing cost disadvantage which ultimately inibits further entry and therefore also product diversity 
(associated to new entrants as industry life cycle progresses). 
This formal model represents effectively the features of the evolution of an industry in terms of number 
of firms, entry and exit, product and process innovations and R-D policy between two radical product 
innovations. The industry starts with a radical product innovation, a low capital intensity production 
process and a lot of subsequent entry with several product innovations. Over time diversity in competing 
products diminishes. process innovation replaces product innovation, entry decreases and industry 
concentration increases. In the theoretical model the emergence of dominant design ( a key element in the 
appreciative model) is captured by the decrease in product diversity and the emphasis on process 
innovation in later stages of industry life cycle. 
Klepper's model is very powerful to explain the evolution of specific industries such as the consumer 
durables ones (automobile. rqpewriters and Tv and TV tubes). (Tushman, ) 
However its generalization to all industries presents several problems. First, the evolution of an industry 
actually collapses to a product life cycle. where products have to be narrowly defined, such as in the case 
of typewriters. In this case the industry cycle started with the first introduction of the typewriter in 1873 
by Remington, experienced a dominant design with Underwood Model 5 in 1899 and was characterized 
by a period of concentration between 1906 and 1940 with the survival of 5 producers: Remington, Royal, 
Smith, Underwood and IBM (Utterback and Suarez). If industries are more broadly defined in terms of 
products or if products are of a system type, however, several of the predictions of the industry life cycle 
model do not hold anymore (as we will see later). 
Second. the sequence of product innovations followed by process innovations does not hold in capital 
intensive industries such as commodity chemicals, synthetic fibers, plastics, petrolchemicals. In these 
industries innovations are mainly of the process type. This sequence does not hold also in industries 
where demand is customized such as in machinery and machine tools and in heavy electrical equipment. 
In this industries in fact innovation is mainly of the product type. 
Third, the industry life cycle model assumes an initial major discontinuity associated with a major 
product innovation. followed by the emergence and consolidation of a dominant design. This is the case 
of the auto industry, which started during the 1890s, experienced a wave of entry between 1900 and 
1920, had a dominant design rirst with the all-steel closed body automobile by Dodge and then with Ford 
Model T and finally was characterized by increasing concentration. Things look differently in other 
industries. For example in the semiconductor industry (as we will see more in detail later) during the 
1950s the emergence of a dominant design- the planar transistor and the planar process- lead to the new 
discontinuity -the integrated circuit. Also in the integrated circuit period, the introduction of several 
oenerations of products were associated with several dominant designs which kept the industry highly 3 
turbulent. up to the new discontinuity characterized by the introduction of the microprocessor. 
Fourth, the initial discontinuity which originates the industry is always associated with a first major 
innovator which generates a stream of new entrants. While this could have been so in industries such as 
typewiters and automobiles, pre-existing conditions differ drastically across industries and highly affect 
the early stages of the evolution of industries. For example, the automatic teller machines industry has 
always been characterized by a highly concentrated industry since its beginning. Similarly, the transistor 
was introduced by a large firm (ATT) and the early entrants were all the major American and European 
large receiving tube producers. 
More importantly, however. this model does not provide us a broad understanding of structural evolution 
in terms of transformation of products nd processes. changes in the boundaries and organization of firms, 
modifications of the connections and relationships among firms and between firms and other institutions 
such as universities. financial institutions and the government. In order to show the type of issues and 
dimensions involved in structural evolution. we turn to the case of three specific industries. 
4. The structural evolution of industries: three cases 
Empirical analysis provides few case-studies of the structural evolution of industries which do not allow 
to draw any major generalizations. These case studies include among others Abernathy (1978), Klein 
( 1977) and Clark ( 1983) on auto. Dosi 11 984) and Malerba ( 1985) on semiconductors, Orsenigo (1 989) 
and Gambardella ( 1992) on biotechnology, Dorfman( 1987) and Flarnm ( 1988) on computers, Mowery- 
Rosenberg(l982) and Phillips (1971) on aircraft, Henderson (1988) on photolithographic alignment 
equipment. Rosenberg (1976) on machine tools. These studies do not necessarily aim to analyze 
structural evolution at their primary research object. When they do so they focus on different aspects and 
use different methodologies. 
However these studies provide a starting point for the analysis of the structural evolution of industries. In 
fact it is possible to claim that the evolution of industries is characterized by a few common patterns. For 
instance technological discontinuities are followed by periods of incremental technical change and later 
on by new discontinuities. En- clusters in specific periods of the evolution, not necessarily only after 
the occurrence of technological discontinuities. Processes of industrial concentration and competence 
enhancing technical change are followed by periods of competence destroying technological change. 
Processes of specialization, diversification and vertical integration always take place with various forms 
and intensity in some stages of ?'ie evolution of the industry. Government policies and public institutions 
play always a major role. Finally, great institutional and organizational differences across countries are 
present. 
In order to develop our empirical understanding more in depth, we will examine in detail a historical 
account of the structural evolution of three industries: computer, semiconductors and biotechnology. 
4.1 The computer industv 
From a perspective related to Pavitt's taxonomy of innovation and to the features of the relevant 
technological regimes. the computer industry is a science based industry which has high opportunity, 
appropriability and cumulativeness conditions 
A focus on the structural evolution of the industry points to several features that are not included in the 
industry life cycle model and which play a relevant role in the evolution of the industry. First of all, the 
key actors in the industry are more than just firms. There are six types of actors related in different ways: 
firms, universities and public laboratories, government (including the ministries of industry, trade, a d  
science and technology and the military), suppliers (of semiconductor components, disk drives, printers. 
and so on), users (consumers, banks, insurance companies, manufacturing firms and so on), and financial 
institutions (such as banks and venture capital). Each of these actors is characterized by different 
attributes and competences. 
During the pioneering stage of the industry (1940s) the main actors involved in research were 
Universities and groups of scientists both in the United States and in Europe, with various traditions , 
competences and commitments. Scientific developments in differential analysis and in abstract general 
purpose computers (for example the Turing machine) played a major role in advancing the generic 
knowledge of the scientific community. The scientific developments in universities took place while 
there was an active industry of mechanical calculating machineries and while vacuum tubes switches 
substituted electromechanical relays. In the United States. scientists in universities worked in connections 
with the government which acted both as source of funds and as a major potential user (the military and 
the Bureau of Commerce). In addition, few private firms were also a source of funds for basic research in 
computers (IBM for example supported the development of the Mark I computer of Aitken at Harvard in 
1944). 
The scientific commitment by \.arious American and European Universities to develop digital 
electromechanical computers ended up in the development of several machines during the 1940s. In the 
United States, for example. ENIAC, the first digital electromechanical computer introduced, was 
developed by Eckert and blauchly in 1946 with the support of the Army at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
The actual origin of the commercial computer industry is related to the move of the two inventors of 
ENIAC from univers i~  into the business world. In 1946 Eckert and Mauchly decided to establish their 
own firm. the Eckert-Mauchly Corporation. with the aim of developing general purpose commercial 
computers for scientific as well as for business accounting uses. Their move became possible because a 
new technological development took place during this period: magnetic drums memories (which allowed 
for data storage in computers). 
The Eckert Mauchly enterprise failed however because external finance (particularly venture capital) 
was limited. Some (albeit insignificant) financial support came fiom firms such as Prudential, Nielson 
and Northrop Aircraft. Financial needs for the new enterprise however remained relevant. As a 
consequence in 1950 the Eckerr-Mauchly Corporation was acquired by Remington Rand, a cash rich 
large typewriter firm. 
The commercial computer industry started therefore in the early 1950s, with the first entry of Remington 
Rand. and then of IBM ( a major punched cards and tabulating machinery company), and the rest of the 
BUNCH (Burroughs, the already mentioned UNIVAC Rand, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell), as well as 
GE and RCA. 
During this initial period appropriability conditions remained high because of the presence of legal 
protection, the relevance of tacit knowledge in developing and producing computers and the importance 
of complementary assets such as customer assistance and distribution network. The technology and the 
main actors were soon different from the ones of the pioneering years. Computer technology now made 
extensive use of magnetic drums memories and later on of transistors, while computers functionality 
expanded to business uses for calculation and accounting (in addition to scientific uses). Relatedly, in 
addition to universities and the government, computer firms opened up extensive and articulated linkages 
with business firms as major users of computers. 
The strategies of the seven major mainframe producers which dominated the market from the early 1950s 
to the early 1970s (IBM. Univac-Speny, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell and Burroughs) were centered 
on the introduction of new products, which could then be modified and improved through a stream of 
incremental innovations. In deciding and shaping their strategies these computer firms had to carefully 
balance their R&D and investement resources between the continuous incremental improvements of their 
existing successful products and the development of totally new products. 
Rather than focussing on basic research and new scientific breakthrough, the first commercial computer 
firms aimed to develop general purpose commercial computers and engaged in continuous R&D, while 
paying considerable efforts to commercialization and post sales-services. The cases of the failure of 
Remington Rand and the success of IBM illustrate this point. While for example Remington Rand did 
not invest in R&D on a continuous basis and therefore declined in importance because it was not able to 
turn out continuously improved computers, IBM rapidly became the new market leader because of its 
continuous R&D effort in developing new products. coupled with marketing competence and good sale 
effort in the commercial market. IBM efforts resulted in the tremendous success of IBM 650 (1954) and 
140 1 ( 1960) in the market for accounting machines. 
At this stage of industry evolution differences emerged in the comparison of the American and the 
English cases. During the 1940s both counmes developed the first scientific computers (such as ENIAC, 
MARK I and WHIRLWIND I in the United States and the COLOSSUS in the United Kingdom). In the 
United States however the presence of advanced firms active in mechanical calculating machinery and 
office equipment rapidly opened up a new link between universities and industry (in addition to the 
existing one between universities and the government). In the United Kingdom on the other hand. 
mechanical calculating machinery firms were not numerous and not particularly technologically active. 
so that in that country a commercial industry started late and with considerable technological and 
commercial disadvantage with respect to the American one. 
During the 1960s IBM competence and involvement in a wide range of mainframe computers lead to the 
introduction of a radical innovation: compatible modular computers. In the early 1960s IBM was already 
the dominant firm in the industry and had several computer families on the market. The comrnittrnent by 
IBM to reach standardization and modularity was possible because a technological development - 
microprogramming- had occurred. Microprogramming (developed at Cambridge in 195 1) made possible 
to have the instructions of the central central processing unit of a computer in ROM rather than in 
hardware. IBM committment resulted in 1965 in the introduction of the first family of modular 
compatible computers-the 1BhI 360-. With the IBM 360 the standardization of components and software 
allowed the exploitation of economies of scale in components production and the consequent upstream 
vertical integration of computer firms, the supply of a broad line of compatible computers and the 
introduction of modularity and incremental modifications in computer design. 
The introduction of the IBM 360 changed drastically the structure of the computer industry. Higher 
barriers to entry were erected with respect to new mainframe producers (which now had to be able to 
supply a broad range of compatible computers) while lower barriers to entry were present for new 
specialized firms aiming to produce peripherals and components. In addition, now a wider range of 
customer firms enlarged the demand of computers, which could be used in different applications. 
Since the late 1960s greater product variety has been associated with a more complex industrial structure. 
Two examples are given by the introduction of minicomputers and personal computers. The introduction 
of the first real time interactive time sharing general purpose minicomputer -the PDP8 by DEC in 1965- 
opened up new types of demand for computers: research laboratories, manufacturing firms (the 
monitoring and control of industrial processes) and small businesses. In addition, computers were used 
for problem solving activities. inserted in computer networks and focussed to specific applications. It 
must be noted that in the case of minicomputers the basic idea- real time environment- had been around 
for quite a long time. but its implementation in a product had to wait until a suitable technology and 
financial institutions ready to support this effort would develop. Minicomputers had a major effect on the 
structure of the industry. First. they led to the new specialized minicomputer firms. In addition, because at 
that time (late 1969s and early 1970s) no extensive software support was provided by minicomputer 
producers. new intermediate acrors emerged between the minicomputer producers and the customers: 
system houses and value added retailers. A similar analysis can be made for another major innovation 
which took place during the 1970s: the personal computer. In this case too, firms profited from the 
availability of a new technology at the component level- the microprocessor- which could allow firms to 
develop products more user mendly and more decentralized in terms of computing capacity and to 
satisfy the needs of a new hpe  of demand: family, hobby, education uses and small business. As in the 
case of minicomputers, also in the case of personal computers new firms entered the industry: specialized 
computer firms (such as Apple. Commodore. Tandy and Compaq) and clones (such as Amstrad). 
In the course of the 1970s and 1980s new hardware market segments emerged. In addition to 
mainframes, present since rhe origin of the industry, supercomputers and minisupercomputers for 
scientific work, medium systems such as workstations, small systems such as portable computers are 
developed. As a consequence a \.ariety of firm strategies emerged. First, f i m  could be either full line 
suppliers, which offer a variety of products ranging from mainframes to personal computers, or 
specialized producers. Second, firms could be vertically integrated in the development of components 
and systems, or system integrarors. Third. firms could follow network strategies for the acquisition of 
external knowledge and for the joint development of new products. Cooperation involved suppliers, 
users or other firms in the industry. Fourth, firms may follow strategies of radical innovations or 
strategies of incremental innovations within certain product families. 
Finally, in the later stages of the development of the industry (1970s and 1980s), software emerged as a 
major component of computer products and software firms became major actors in the computer 
industry. The event that started that structural change dates back to the decision of IBM to unbundle 
software products from hardware by pricing software independently from hardware. IBM unbundling 
decision created a set of producrs which could be offered independently on the market. New products 
such as system s o h a r e ,  appiications toois, cross industry and industry specific application solutions, 
customized s o h a r e  and software services were created. The structure of the industry was severely 
affected because new types of firms such as system integrators, software houses and software se~vices 
firms became major players in the industry and computer firms engaged in software activities had to 
have much closer and interactive links with users and leading customers. It must be noted that application 
solutions, custom s o h a r e  and software services required a different knowledge base for innovation than 
hardware production: an in depth understanding of end-uses applications of information systems in terms 
of horizontal applications (such as spreadsheet or word processing), vertical applications (such as 
software for banks, transport, and so on) and specific users applications (custom software). Therefore, in 
order to be successful in applications, firms had to understand market needs, identi@ the relevant 
dimensions of specific market applications. target their products to those dimensions and interact on a 
continuous basis with users. In s o h a r e  applications the conditions of high opportunity coupled with the 
pervasiveness of the technology and the high variety of applications implied a high heterogeneity of 
firms. Even within the same application. firms ranged from vertically integrated computer companies, to 
diversified electronics producers, to multiproduct software houses, to small specialized firms, to major 
users whith detailed knowledge about a specific application. In this realm, firms strategies ranged from 
the aim to introduce major innovations. to the attempt to innovate on a continuous basis by improving 
and modify existing proprietary s o h a r e  products, to imitation by introducing small improvements in the 
software packages developed by other firms. In addition, given the complexity of the knowledge base 
required for innovative activities and the heterogeneity of competences, cooperation among firms and 
networking strategies became quite widespread by providing complementary and specialized expertise 
regarding computer hardware or basic operating s o h a r e ,  features of specific applications, characteristics 
of market niches or user requirements. 
In sum, in the early 1990s. the structure of the computer industry was quite articulated and complex, far 
from the concentrated structure predicted by the industry life cycle model for later stages of industry 
development. Because the development of new computer products requires the integration of complex 
architectures. advanced system sohare .  very large scale semiconductor components (such as 
microprocessors and memories). disk drives, terminals. floppy disks, in addition to articulated network 
interfaces in the ealy 1990s firms may be either full line suppliers (such as DM), which offer a variety of 
products ranging from mainframes to personal computers, or specialized producers. Second, firms may 
be vertically integrated in the development of components and systems (such as BM),  or system 
integrators (such as Olivetti). Third. firms may follow network strategies for the acquisition of external 
knowledge and for the joint development of new products, by involving suppliers, users or other firms in 
the industry. Fourth. firms may follow strategies of radical innovations, incremental improvements or 
imitation. 
According to the taxonomy of patterns of innovative activities and to the features of the relevant 
technoloigical regime the semiconductor industry falls in between a science based industry and a scale 
intensive one and has been characterized by high opportunity and appropriability conditions and by an 
increasing degree of cumulativeness 
Its structural evolution however is not fully captured by the basic dimensions of the industry life cycle 
model. 
In the semiconductor industry the main actors have been firms, the government (including the military) 
and financial institutions. 
The industry began with the discovery of the transistor at ATT's Bell Laboratories. In the United States 
the early days of the semiconductor industry (1950s) were characterized by high opportunity conditions 
tvpical of a new industry based on a new scientific field. The knowledge base was rather simple and 
linked to science (solid state physics and chemistry). Market opportunities were clearly perceived and 
identified by firms in the industry: hearing aids, telecommunications, radio sets and computers. The 
future potentials of transistors were also clear. The relevance of the discovery of the transistor for the 
development of the electronic industry was recognized by a large number of firms, scientists and 
entrepreneurs both within the existing infant electronics industry and outside it. As a consequence, all the 
firms in the electronics industry which were producing electron tubes entered the new semiconductor 
industry (some of these firms were large venically integrated and diversified producers, such as General 
Electric, RCA, Sylvania). 
In the early days of the industry ( 1950s) most of the firms in the semiconductor industry would follow 
strategies of continuous major innovations. Once a firm would develop a new product it would aim at 
rapidly launching it on the market. In the meantime, its researchers would continuously explore new 
technological possibilities and aimed at introducing radically new products on the market. New product 
introduction would frustrate the attempt to focus on process innovation for a given product and to try to 
incrementally modify existing products and processes. During these years, cases of failures of firms 
which preferred to stay with existing products or to try to automatize the production process in order to 
reach a high level of efficiency (rather than innnovate continuously) were common. During the 1950s the 
structure of the Amencan industry was characterized by both large established firms and new firms. 
Because opportunities were high the 19.50s were characterized by several entrants, both new firms and 
established firms coming from other industries. 
.At the end of the 1950s the innovative strategies of two merchant producers- Fairchild and Texas 
Instruments- resulted in two radical innovations (the planar process and the integrated circuit) which 
altered the technological environment and the behavior of firms in the industry. The technological regime 
that emerged with integrated circuits was different from the one that characterized the transistor period. 
High opportunity conditions were still present. The knowledge base however, became more and more 
centered on design and engineering rather than on basic science, and became increasingly tacit and firm- 
specific. In addition, the cumulativeness of technological change increased because firms developed 
advanced capabilities in specific innovative activities now based on some basic processes and products: 
silicon (as basic material), planar (as the basic manufacturing process) and integration (as the main 
product concept). As a consequence of the tacitness of the knowledge base (linked to engineering and 
technical know-how) and of the cumulativeness of technological change, during the 1960s 
semiconductor firms enlarged their strategic options, by following strategies of incremental innovations 
by improving and modifying existing products and process, eventually moving down the learning curve 
and maintaing lead times over competitors. Some semiconductor firms however continued to follow 
strategies of radical innovations (followed by a continuous stream of incremental improvements), 
although in this respect major differences were present. For example, both Fairchild and Texas 
Instruments were major innovators but had quite different behavior. During the 1960s both Texas 
Instruments and Fairchild introduced the planar silicon transistor ( 196 1) and moved into TTL quite soon, 
beginning to develop new types of TTL devices over an extended period. But while Fairchild followed a 
strategy based on continuous exploration of technological opportunities and high R- D investments 
(without paying too much attention to the subsequent exploitation of a product) Texas Instruments was 
able to maintain a successhl balance between major innovations and the movement down the learning 
curve on existing integrated circuit. This proved a quite successful strategy so that Texas Instruments 
ended up dominating the market for integrated circuits in the early 1970s. 
The introduction of the integrated circuit greatly affected the structure of the industry. Several established 
producers, which either did not have advanced competences, or were successful in transistors or did not 
believe in the potentialities of the integrated circuit, exit the industry. A new stream of entrants moved 
into the industry. Entry would occur mainly through the introduction of new products. 
The trajectory of miniaturization and integration that was pursued by firms in the industry since the 1960s 
resulted eventually in the introduction of the microprocessor (another radical innovation) and in the large 
scale integration and systemic features of semiconductor devices. 
In the early 1990s, the semiconductor industry is characterized by three major product groups: products 
requiring a whole set of innovative and technological capabilities (such as microprocessors), products 
requiring mainly advanced engineering and production capabilities (such as memories), or products 
requiring mainly advanced design capabilities able to target specific applications or customers (such as 
application specific integrated circuits ASICs). In these product and market segments, firms are 
characterized by specific strategies and organizations. In microprocessors, established as well as new 
merchant producers (such as Intel. Zilog, Sun and MIPS), and computer producers (such as IBM and 
Hewlett Packard) follow strategies of introduction of new microprocessors, later modified and improved 
over the years. On the contrary. in memories. established vertically integrated Japanese firms (such as 
NEC, Fujitsu and Hitachi) are characterized by advanced engineering and production competence, large 
investments in manufacturing equipment and strategies based on learning curves and high volume 
production for their own use and for the external market. In ASIC new small design houses, positioned 
between users and manufacturers of ssrniconductors, have emerged. These small and medium sue firms 
(such as Mietec. Advanced Silicon Corporation, Lasarray, Integrated Power Semiconductors, European 
Silicon Structures) do not have high fixed costs and R&D expenditures and are specialized in the design 
of integrated circuits based on the understanding of specific applications, user-producer interaction and 
tailoring design to specific users needs. The production of the semiconductor devices with the masks 
designed by the design houses then takes place in large or medium sue silicon foundries. 
One final note regards the fact that the evolution of the industry in terms of structure has been quite 
different in the United States. Europe and Japan. While in the United States both merchant producers and 
vertically integrated firms are present. in Europe and in Japan only vertically integrated companies 
operate. 
In biotechnology, the main actors are firms. universities and financial institutions (venture capital). 
The take-off of industrial research in biotechnology immediately followed two key scientific discoveries 
in the early 1970s. i.e. recombinant DNA and hybridoma technology. These break-throughs opened 
enormous opportunities fbr innovation in a large variety of industries, primarily pharmaceuticals. 
Innovation implied however the acquisition, understanding and improving of new basic scientific 
knowledge in a wide variety of disciplines. Moreover, it implied the fusion with other older biologically- 
based technologies. especially as large-scale production processes are concerned. 
In the United States a high rate of entry of new specialised companies (New Biotechnology Firms- 
NBFs) was made possible by the noveity of the knowledge base , which weakened the entry barrier 
constituted by the cumulative nature of technical change. The NBFs were usually formed through the 
collaboration of a scientist and a professional manager backed by venture capital in order to apply the 
new scientific discoveries to commercial product development. Their specific skills concerned research, 
but they lacked the experience and the organisation necessaq to support crucial aspects of the innovative 
process, such as manufacturing and - above all- the testing and adrmnistrative procedures for the approval 
of new products and marketing. 
The absence of capabilities and structures in these fields impaired also the possibility of fully 
appropriating the profits deriving from innovations. Appropriability conditions represented a crucial 
strategic problem of the NBFs. Particularly in the early stages, the relevant knowledge had to a large 
extent a generic nature and could in principle be codified. Patents and the control of complementary 
assets represented therefore a crucial requisite for the private appropriation of the profits generated by 
innovations. Yet, considerable confusion surrounded the conditions at which patents could be obtained. 
Established companies faced the opposite problem. They had to acquire and develop the new knowledge, 
but had the experience and the structures necessary to control testing, production and marketing. As a 
result, innovative activities in biotecnnoiogy involved the development of variegated and complex 
organsational solutions, in particular of collaborative relationships between the NBFs, established 
companies and the academic cornrnuniry. 
The strategies of the N BFs varied considerably in at least two aspects: in terms of the research directions 
they pursued and in terms of their attitudes towards vertical integration and collaboration. 
.4s far as the directions of research are concerned, at one extreme one finds companies which tried to 
develop as soon as possible products which could be sold on the marketplace, attaining an early lead 
through the specialisation in a specific niche. This strategy implied concentrating on the most immediate 
application of genetic engineering and on products which did not require large scale production 
processes or substantial marketing efforts. e.g. diagnostics based on hybridoma technology. Companies 
like Hybritech and Centocor are good examples of this strategic posture. At the other extreme, one finds 
companies which tried to develop core technological capabilities in a wide range of areas, exploiting the 
technological complementarities made possible by genetic engineering. In different ways, companies like 
Genentech. Biogen and Celltech belong to this category. 
As far as vertical integration is concerned, although the aim of of the large majority of the NBFs was to 
become fully integrated pharmaceutical companies, integration could not be achieved rapidly and 
costlessly. In the absence of products generating revenues, the NBFs became essentially research 
companies and specialised suppliers of high technology intermediate products, performing contract 
research for and in collaboration with established companies. Some of them, however, linked with a large 
number of contractors trying to avoid to establishing too close a relationship with specific partners (e.g 
Genentech). Other NBFs restricted instead their linkages to a small group of contractors, with whom 
long-term. stable relationships were built. Examples of this kind of relationships are the linkages between 
Chiron and Ciba Geigy, DNAX with Schering Plough and Ortho Diagnostics with Johnson and Johnson. 
The strategies of the established companies were in some way specular to those pursued by the NBFs. 
For them too, entry in the new technology required a gradual process of acquisition of external 
knowledge and the development of adequate organisational solutions. Their main strategic and 
organisational problems concerned the timing and the size of their involvement; the integration of the 
new knowledge into their specific competences and organisations; its utilisation for the development of 
new products. 
The timing and the commitment to biotechnology among large established firms varies markedly as a 
function of the proximity of their competences to the new technologies, to their diversification strategies 
and to their technological expectations. Many of them, especially the large integrated European and, 
above all, the Japanese chemical groups, considered genetic engineering as an important new research 
tool and a source of opportunities for diversification, rather than a direct source of new products and 
processes. Its embodiment was however a slow and difficult process, because it implied a radical change 
in the research procedures. a redefinition of the disciplinary boundaries within the laboratories and, in 
some case, also in the divisional structure of the company. Collaborative research with the NBFs and 
with universities allowed these companies, in any case, to get access to the new technology and to 
experiment alternative directions. The advantages stemming from these interactions could be fully 
exploited however only through the contextual development of in-house capabilities, which made it 
possible to absorb and complement the knowledge supplied by external sources. Collaboration with 
universities. NBFs and internal research were indeed strongly complementary. The cases of Hoffman- 
LaRocne ( H L R )  and Genentecn illustrate vividly this strategy. HLR entered biotechnology mainly on the 
basis of its competences and interests in the field of immunology. Subsequently, HLR developed a wide 
network of linkages with the NBFs (particularly with Genentech), which was eventually acquired in 
1990. Genentech was the first to introduce in 1987 on the market the first important product of genetic 
engineering, i.e the tissue plasminogen activator (t.p.a.). Genentech's product was initially an enormous 
commercial success and the product was sold at very high prices. Very shonly, however, new similar 
products were launched by competing companies characterized by higher quality and lower prices. 
Genentech's effon to come first to the market and to sustain by itself all the commercialization of the 
product left the company in a difficult financial situation. which ultimately led to the acquisition by HLR. 
The variety of strategies and the development of collaborative relationships reflected the novelty, the 
uncertainty and the fast progress of the technology, the complexity of its knowledge base, the difference 
in the core capabilities of the major actors. As the technology developed, however, some definite and 
quite similar strategies gradually emerged. A large fraction of the NBFs became specialised producers of 
diagnostics based on monoclonal antibodies. Other companies concentrated their efforts on the 
development of pharmaceutical and -to a lesser extent- agricultural products. In particular, within the 
field of therapeutics, companies concentrated research in a small range of areas. Established companies 
madually tailored their involvement in biotechnology to their wider technological strategies. 
- 
In particular, the incentives towards increasing degrees of vertical integration are becoming stronger. As 
the technology matures, the tacit component of knowledge acquires more relevance and progress 
becomes more cumulative. making the exchange of knowledge more difficult. Finally, vertical 
integration raises entry barriers and provides the innovator with strategic complementary assets. Thus, 
established companies have gradually strengthened their in-house research efforts and many NBFs, and 
particularly monoclonal antibodies companies. have indeed succeeded in developing over time in-house 
manufacturing facilities. However. it must be stressed that most firms do not have the need for large scale 
manufacturing. Only a handhl of therapeutic products are actually sold on the marketplace and in any 
case - again, particularly for monoclonal-based diagnostics - small scale production is often sufficient. 
Vertical integration. however. seldom reaches marketing . 
4.3. Lessons und yuestions/i.onl rhe stories of lhe lhree induslries 
What kind of lessons may be drawn from these three histories? If we focus on structural evolution, 
several remarks could be advanced which point to major differences from the predictions provided by the 
industry life cycle model discussed previously. First, the structural evolution highlighted by the three 
cases is inextricably linked to the continuous transformation of existing products and the emergence of 
new technologies. This transformation is something different from the sequence of types of innovations 
proposed by the industry life cycle (product first, process later) does not hold. 
In addition, the emergence of a new industry from the existing ones is a key process which may start 
from quite different initial conditions because of the specific features and technological proximity of 
existing technologies and products, the characteristics of production and the structure and competence of 
the industry producing technologically related or substitute products. While in few cases the new is a 
total rupture from the past and is characterized by totally new entrants, in several cases entrants are firms 
already active in technologically correlated industries which diversify into the new one. 
Moreover the very nature. oranintion and boundaries of the firms are also continuously changing during 
the evolution of an industry. New tirms appear on the scene, many of them exiting quickly, a few other 
surviving, growing and sometimes becoming the new leaders. Old firms change their strategies and forms 
of organization. Specialization. division of labour as well as lateral and vertical integration are also 
essential features of this process. Firms merge or generate other companies. New entities specialized in 
one particular activity appear. whereas at the same time other activities are integrated within the same 
organization. In this respect the growth of firms' experience and competence in specific technologies and 
products may greatly affect the direction of technological change, the development of an industry and 
competition among firms. In fact from the stories told before firm competence and existing links across 
firms have greatly shaped subsequent directions in industry evolution. For example, the introduction by 
IBM of the modular IBM 360 has been stimulated and has been dependent upon its competences and 
specific relationshpis with its customers and suppliers. Relatedly, the success of several firms in the 
computer industry has been due to the presence of a type of experience and competence adapted and 
tuned to the existing technology and structure of the industry. This has been called competence 
enhancing (vs competence destroying) technical change by other authors, (see the case of 
photolithographic aligners by Henderson and Clark, 1989). In our stories, the cases of two competent 
firms -the successful IBM (competent in office machinery and punched cards machinery) and the 
unsuccessful Remington Rand (competent in typewriter)- proves this point during the early stages of the 
computer industry (in the passage from scientific to commercial computers). Similarly, the failure of 
Eckert and Mauchly's business enterprise at the beginning of the commercial computer industry is due to 
the same reason: Eckert and Mauchly were not able to carry out successfully their newly founded 
business entreprise because they lacked business and manufacturing competence and acted outside their 
previous environment. Relatedly, in our stories some firms were successful because they were able to 
rapidly exploit newly created openings in demand and in technology, which the established firms with 
their experience and competences were not able to fulfill. The example of the specialized personal 
computer firms able to exploit the invention of the microprocessors and to open up new links with new 
types of demand such as famiiy, education and small business, is a case in point. 
Finally linkages and connections of various types and intensity among firms, between firms, suppliers 
and users and between firms and other institutions are formed, consolidate and disappear during the 
evolution of an industry and greap shape firms actions, activities and growth. Take again the computer 
industry for example. Here any lack of analysis of the role of cooperative agreements between hardware 
and software firms or beween semiconductor suppliers and computer firms would greatly impair any 
understanding of the evolution of the computer industry. In general, the relationships between these 
entities has changed over time change: not only their organization evolve, but one observes also 
continuous innovation in market relationships. New forms of contracts appear, new specialized markets 
emerge linking together previously unrelated entities. Transactions are organized in a more systematic 
way, and interactions become increasingly tailored to the needs of the partners involved. Putting it 
another way, the economic entities do not just simply multiply or change. They organize themselves into 
particular patterns of connections. 
In sum. one obsenles over time complex dynamic processes at work involving various firms and 
institutions connected in various ways. Phases of intense change in structure are often followed by 
periods of relative stability, where entities and their relationships do not change too drastically, but 
proceed incrementally. In most cases during the evolution of an industry a major drastic change in 
products has been associated with a change in industrial structure. For example, the change from the first 
commercial computers to the modular computers in the early 1960s implied also a drastic change in the 
relationships among computer firms ( i n  particular between IBM, the other large computer firms and the 
small compatible computer tirms). In several cases the introduction of a radically new product during the 
evolution of an industry (and not just at the beginning of it, as the industry life cycle assumes) has been 
associated with the emergence of new types of actors (such as new types of firms, suppliers, users and so 
on). For example the introduction of minicomputers or personal computers implied the emergence of new 
types of firms (the specialized producers of minicomputers or personal computers) and new types of 
users (small business and families). 
5.  Where do we go from here? A research agenda 
The discussion of the structural evolution of industries point to some final conclusions and some 
directions for future research. 
In general a lot more empirical evidence on some of the issues discussed in this paper is required. The 
modes of entry and the type and sources of entrants, the features of exit, the dynamics of specialization 
and vertical integration. and so on require a much finer grained empirical scrutiny. One could advance 
also the statement that a necessary second step is the development of taxonomies of industry evolution in 
terms of some basic dimensions of structural change. 
These key dimensions should include first of all a sensible definition of the boundaries of an industry. For 
the purpose of analyzing structural evolution. a useful starting point could be the definition of an industry 
as a form of organization of economic activities at a high level of aggregation, characterized by specific 
structural relationships between different entities and between such entities and the products that are 
produced. I t  must be noted that products are continuously transformed during the evolution of an 
industry, and may be related to other products both within the industry and outside the industry in terms 
of technologies or in terms of functions. Reducing the boundaries of an industry to a single product is too 
reductive and may miss some essenrial properties of the patterns of industry evolution. Larger industry 
boundaries allow for the possibility of industry rejuvenation through technological and industrial shocks, 
with new structures emerging over time from existing ones or from new entrants and the branching out in 
different periods of new products and industry segments. 
in this broader view of structural evolution, firms remain the key actors. Firms however have to be 
analyzed according to several dimensions at once: competence, innovative activities, productive 
specialization, boundaries, organizational structure and, finally, connections with other actors. 
These connections have to include first of all the relationships that firms have with suppliers and users. 
These actors not only interact with firms in an industry through the exchange of products, knowledge 
and people, but in several cases -as in vertical integration- they are involved in the very process of 
structural change. 
in addition to suppliers and users also other types of institutions -scientific institutions, financial 
instituitions and the government- have to be included in the analysis. These institutions greatly shape the 
structural changes in an industry, by affecting the stock of scientific knowledge available to firms, the 
diffusion of new technical knowledge to firms, the amount of R-D carried on by firms, the speed of 
development and the extent of production. the entry of new firms and the exit of established ones. The 
inclusions of these actors is particularly relevant for the comparative analysis of the structural evolution 
of industries across countries. 
In conclusion. the analysis of structural evolution has to jointly take into consideration all the various 
structural dimensions that are usually examined separately in most studies of industrial oragnizations: 
size, boundaries of firms, ente. growth and exit, specialization, vertical integration, diversification, and 
formal and informal networks. In fact srmctural evolution in most cases implies various structural 
changes taking place at once. with one change mggenng or being closely linked to another. 
One last word about theory and modelling. The focus of this paper is strongly empirical. We have not 
discussed the more theoretically-oriented contributions to this issue. Yet, the sort of empirical analysis 
discussed here needs - in our view - to be strictly complemented by the development of rigorous 
theoretical efforts aiming at the understanding of the general mechanisms - if any - which generate the 
regularities and differences in industrial evolution. Conversely, such an effort raises several fundamental 
questions related to the basic philosophy, methodology and tools of theoretical analysis and strains the 
scope of current theoretical models. 
Over the last decade, interest in modelling industrial change has been growing rapidly. One finds models 
with strongly different orientation and which use different instruments. Some of these models attempt to 
extend the basic concepts of equilibrium analysis to complex dynamic environments To this strand 
belong models such as Jovanovic (19821, Ericson and Pakes (1992) and Jovanovic and Rob (1990) 
Other models, following Nelson and Winter's (1 982) seminal contribution adopt an explicit evolutionary 
approach to the analysis of industrial change 3. In these models, neither full rationality nor equilibrium are 
j ~ c l s o n  and Winter ( 1982). Iwai ( I  984) S;ivckry, Dosi and Orsenigo (1988), Winter (1984). Dosi and Salvatore (1992) and 
Dosi.Marsili.Orscnigu and Salvatun' ( 1993 ),Lliuson ( 1 986). (:hiaromonte and Dosi (1  993), Silvemerg and Lehnen (1 993). 
Sivcrbcrg and Vcrspagcn ( 1994). 
assumed. Almost all of these tbnnai models are characterized by viewing industries as growing and 
changing over time in an uncertain environment as the outcome of processes of learning of and market 
selection on (sometimes heterogeneous) firms. Formally, most of these efforts are modelled as dynamic 
stochastic systems. whose properties are studied via analytical methods and more often, given the 
difficulties of deriving robust results. via simulation techniques. 
Most of these models, however. focus on the analysis of what we have called "industrial dynamics", i.e 
patterns of entry and exit. firms' growth, etc. With the noticeable exception of Klepper's model, the 
modelling of industries life cycles is still largely unexplored. Even more so, as it concerns the theoretical 
analysis of structural industrial evolution. 
Clearly, this state of affairs is due partly to the conceptual and technical dificulties that have to be met. 
As we mentioned previously, any serious attempt at theorizing should come to grips with concepts such 
as for example firms'competences. At the same times, it should be able to identi@ and restrict 
appropriately the mechanisms which generate particular dynamic paths of the forms of industrial 
organization. 
However, as previously said. we would stress the point that other more important reasons are related to 
the lack of empirical knowledge of these phenomena, robust stylizations and taxonomies of the patterns 
of industrial evolution. At a very preliminary level, we still have to be able to identi@ more precisely 
what kind of phenomena are to be the objects of the analysis, at which time-scale they do belong and 
how these phenomena are linked together over the different time-scales. 
The lesson coming from Marshall. Schumpeter, Kuznets and other classical economists is - in our view - 
that a full understanding of the evolution of industries requires the integration of the three levels of 
analysis discussed in this paper. 
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